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An Empirical Analysis of the Strategic Use of Corporate Social Responsibility 
 
Abstract 
  Recent theories of the strategic use of corporate social responsibility (CSR) emphasize 
the role of information asymmetry and how CSR is likely to be matrixed into a firm’s 
differentiation strategy.  A key empirical implication of these theories is that firms selling 
experience or credence goods are more likely to be socially responsible than firms selling search 
goods. Using firm-level data, we report evidence that is consistent with this hypothesis.   
 
Keywords: Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), Search Goods, Experience Goods, Credence 
Goods 
JEL Codes: M14, D21  
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I.  Introduction 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) occurs when firms engage in activity that appears 
to advance a social agenda beyond that which is required by law.  For instance, an automobile 
manufacturer could produce “hybrid” vehicles, which significantly exceed government fuel 
efficiency requirements.  Similarly, a savings and loan association is said to be socially 
responsible when it approves a higher proportion of loans to poor or minority borrowers than 
required by the Community Reinvestment Act, which governs the lending practices of these 
institutions.     
Recent theories of CSR (Baron (2001), McWilliams and Siegel (2001), Bagnoli and 
Watts (2003)) assert that firms engage in “profit-maximizing” CSR.  That is, companies are 
assumed to be socially responsible because they anticipate a benefit from these actions.  
Examples of such benefits might include reputation enhancement, the ability to charge a 
premium price for its output, or the use of CSR to recruit and retain high quality workers.  These 
benefits are presumed to offset the higher costs associated with CSR, since resources must be 
allocated to allow the firm to achieve CSR status.  
These theoretical studies emphasize how this activity is likely to be matrixed into a firm’s 
differentiation strategies.  They also focus on the importance of information asymmetry.  The 
purpose of this paper is to determine whether observed patterns of investment in CSR are 
consistent with the strategic use of CSR.  More specifically, we present a simple empirical test of 
the hypothesis that firms selling experience and credence goods are more likely to be socially 
responsible than firms selling search goods.  
  The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  In the next section, we briefly 
review some recent theoretical studies relating to the strategic use of CSR.  This section also   4 
outlines the simple model we wish to estimate.  Section III presents our data and describes the 
construction of variables used in the empirical analysis.  Empirical results are presented in 
Section IV.   The final section consists of caveats and preliminary conclusions.     
 
II. Literature Review and Theoretical Model  
To the best of our knowledge, Baron (2001) and McWilliams and Siegel (2001) were the 
first two papers to explicitly model “profit-maximizing” CSR.  Baron (2001) coined the phrase 
“strategic CSR.”  He defines CSR as the “private provision of a public good.” More importantly, 
Baron (2001) asserts that companies compete for socially responsible customers by explicitly 
linking their social contribution to product sales.  A good example of such strategic CSR was 
Ben and Jerry’s commitment to donate 7.5% of its pre-tax profit to social causes.   
In a similar vein, McWilliams and Siegel (2001) outlined a simple theoretical model in 
which two firms sell identical goods, except that one company decides to add an additional 
“social” attribute or feature to its product.  This social feature is valued by some consumers or, 
potentially, by other stakeholders.  In this theory of the firm-based model, managers conduct a 
cost/benefit analysis to determine the level of resources to devote to CSR activities/attributes.  
Simply put, firms simultaneously assess the demand for CSR and the cost of satisfying this 
demand and then determine the optimal level of CSR to provide.  
A key implication of a theory of the firm/strategic perspective on CSR is that this activity 
is likely to be matrixed into the company’s business-level differentiation strategies.  For 
example, a “hybrid” version of a Honda Accord generates less pollution than a standard Honda 
Accord.  Most consumers will consider the hybrid car to be superior to the standard model.  
Some consumers are also willing to pay a price premium for the hybrid car, given that the social   5 
characteristic of less pollution is “valuable” to them.  Other types of CSR investment relate to 
the adoption of CSR-related production processes, where the focus of concern relates to the 
extent to which the firms’ production methods are socially responsible.  Thus, many natural food 
companies (e.g., Hain Celestial Group, Inc.) place labels on their products signifying the use of 
organic, pesticide-free ingredients.     
Bagnoli and Watts (2003) extend Baron (2001) by analyzing how the structure of 
competition in the market for the private good affects CSR.  They assume that the consumer has 
perfect information about both the private good and the associated public good.  In their model, 
the consumer has a willingness to pay because the firm produces a product with jointly supplied 
benefits.  The authors consider two oligopoly models: Cournot quality competition and Bertrand 
price competition.   A key finding of their study is that there is an inverse relationship between 
the provision of CSR and competition in the market for the private good.     
  Other papers (Baron (2001), Fedderson & Gilligan, (2001)) provide additional insights on 
the strategic implications of CSR, especially the role of asymmetric information.  While some 
CSR attributes are easily observed, it is sometimes difficult for consumers and other stakeholder 
to assess a firm’s social performance.  The level of asymmetric information regarding internal 
operations can be mediated by the firm itself or by activists.  
  For instance, companies such as McDonalds, Motorola, and Nike publish annual reports 
on social responsibility.  One can view this activity as a form of advertising, especially for more 
general types of CSR.  While such reports may be useful, some consumers perceive this 
information as biased, since it is filtered through senior management.  Fedderson & Gilligan 
(2001) assert that activists can play an important role in addressing this concern, by supplying 
consumers with a public good, i.e., information they can rely on to choose socially responsible   6 
firms.    
  McWilliams and Siegel (2001) specifically advanced the hypothesis that a firm selling an 
experience good is more likely to engage in CSR than a firm producing a search good.  
Experience goods must be used or consumed before their true value to the consumer can be 
determined. Examples of experience goods and services are automobiles, appliances, weight 
control programs and mutual funds. Advertising of experience goods will stress the reputation of 
the firm for high quality. On the other hand, search goods and services are readily evaluated prior 
to purchase, and most advertising will involve information about product availability and price. 
Clothing, footwear and furniture are typically cited as examples of search goods.  
The concept of experience and search goods is generally attributed to Philip Nelson 
(1970, 1974), who developed a taxonomy of such goods that was extended by Liebermann and 
Flint-Goor (1996).  Lancaster (1981) noted that consumers of high quality products have the 
strongest demand for product information because while low price is typically a reliable signal of 
low quality, a high price may not signify high quality.  Given that affluent consumers are most 
likely to demand high quality goods, CSR as a signal of product quality is likely to be associated 
with upscale goods and services. 
  Our interpretation of this phenomenon combines extends insights from the Bagnoli and 
Watts (2003) and McWilliams and Siegel (2001) models.   Specifically, we assert that consumers 
view CSR activity as a signal about the attributes of the private good sold by the firm.  That is 
the reason why experience goods are more likely to be associated with CSR.  
The notion of a consumer demand for CSR is based on the notion that buyers believe that 
a reliable and honest firm will produce better products.  In the minds of some consumers, CSR is 
viewed as a signal of such honesty and reliability.   Thus, CSR is a form of product   7 
differentiation-a form of advertising to establish or sustain brand loyalty.   The producer of a 
search good such as food or furniture might choose CSR, e.g., to use pesticide-free ingredients or 
pledge not to use old-growth wood.  In this case, the consumer might prefer the product simply 
because of a desire to support the environment or some other cause, rather than using CSR as an 
information proxy. Thus, the relative importance of experience versus search goods in the CSR 
choice is an empirical issue, which provides a key motivation for this paper.     
 
A Model of Corporate Social Responsibility           
A firm is hypothesized to engage in CSR if it anticipates benefits greater than costs. Let 
ΠCSR =  βΝxCSR + εCSR be the expected profit earned if a firm chooses CSR. The x vector would 
include input and output prices (a profit equation), and background variables such as product 
type, market structure, and regulatory environment. An error term εc is appended because this is 
intended as an empirical exercise. A firm that chooses not to be CSR earns ΠNCSR = γΝxNCSR + 
εNCSR.  The expected net profit from choosing CSR is C* =  βΝxCSR - γΝxNCSR  +  (εCSR - εNCSR) = 
 δΝx + ε, but C* is not observed. However, we do observe that C* = 1 if a firm chooses CSR and 
C* = 0 if not, and assume that this implies that ΠCSR > ΠNCSR.   This type of regression equation 
is routinely estimated as either a binomial probit or logit model, depending on the assumed 
distribution of the residuals. This approach is analogous to the random utility model, in which 
consumers are observed to choose a good or service, such as a particular mode of transport, 
assuming the choice selected confers the highest level of utility, which is not observed.  
Although the focus of this paper is upon the subset of the x coefficient vector relating to 
the taxonomy of search, experience and credence goods, the literature suggests that there are 
additional determinants of the propensity of firms to be socially responsible.  Following   8 
Waddock and Graves (1997) and McWilliams & Siegel (2000), we include measures of lagged 
profitability, firm size, and R&D intensity as control variables.  The inclusion of lagged profits is 
based on the notion that better financial performance results in higher CSR.  Size is meant to 
control for the possibility that large firms are more vulnerable to pressure groups or the 
possibility that there may be economies of scale in CSR.   McWilliams and Siegel (2000) assert 
it may be appropriate to include R&D investment in this equation, since CSR should be related 
to product innovation and differentiation strategies, in general.  Thus, we estimate equations of 
the following form:  
(1) CSR1 or CSR2 = f (GOODTYPE, LPROFIT, SALES, RDINT) 
where CSR1 and CSR2 are dummy variables that are equal to 1 if the firm is considered to be 
socially responsible; 0 otherwise, GOODTYPE refers to a set of dummy variables denoting 
whether the firm’s products or services are search, experience, or credence goods, LPROFIT is 
lagged profit (return on equity), SALES is annual sales revenue (a proxy for firm size), and 
RDINT is the ratio of R&D to sales. 
  
 
III. Data  
Measures of Corporate Social Responsibility  
  The first step in our empirical analysis is to identify socially responsible firms.  To 
accomplish this task, we rely on data from Kinder, Lyndenberg, and Domini (KLD), a firm that 
rates the social performance of corporations.  KLD sells this information to portfolio managers 
and other institutional investors who wish to incorporate social factors into their investment 
decisions.  Such social investors seek to “screen” their portfolios to exclude companies that   9 
violate their social principles.   
  We use two alternative measures of CSR based on KLD data.  The first measure of CSR 
(CSR1) is a dummy variable, with a value of 1 if a firm is included in the 2002 KLD Large Cap 
Social Index (LCSI); 0 otherwise.  The LCSI is drawn from the Russell 1000 Index, which 
covers more than 90% of U.S. stock market capitalization.  The Russell 1000 Index is much 
broader than the Dow Jones or Standard and Poor’s indices and thus, includes a higher 
proportion of smaller (publicly-traded) firms.   
KLD uses a combination of surveys, financial statements, articles in the popular press 
and academic journals (especially law journals), and government reports to assess social 
performance along eleven dimensions: military contracting, nuclear power, gambling, tobacco, 
alcohol, community relations, diversity, employee relations, environment, and product quality 
(innovation/R&D), and non-U.S. operations (usually environment and labor relations).  They use 
these data to assess “strengths” and “concerns” regarding these dimensions of social 
performance, in order to determine if a company is worthy of being judged socially responsible.  
The KLD LCSI consists of firms in the Russell index that satisfy all of the following criteria: (1) 
they derive less than 2% of their gross revenue from the production of military weapons, (2) they 
have no involvement in nuclear power, gambling, tobacco, and alcohol, (3) they have a positive 
record in each of the remaining social categories. 
Our second measure of CSR is constructed directly from the KLD qualitative measures of 
social performance.  Using the KLD data on community relations, diversity, employee relations, 
environmental performance, product quality, and international social practices, we sum the 
strengths and concerns along each of these dimensions for each company.  We then compute the 
sum of a firm’s strengths minus the sum of its weaknesses (DIFF).  If this difference is non-  10 
negative (DIFF>0) then a firm is defined as being socially responsible or CSR2 =1; 0 
otherwise.  A drawback of this measure is that it equally weights all strengths and concerns, as 
well as each social dimension.   
 
Classification of Search and Experience Goods 
 Our next task is to identify whether firms sell search, experience, or credence goods.  
The basic data set consists of 696 publicly-traded corporations, 495 of which appear in the KLD 
Large Cap Social Index (LCSI) and thus, are considered to be socially responsible (using our 
first measure of CSR). These 696 firms were selected because they could be identified as 
producing either search goods or experience Goods, using the North American Industrial 
Classification System (NAICS) code, as reported in the COMPUSTAT data base. Conglomerate 
firms or firms producing industrial products not sold to final consumers are therefore omitted.  
Table 1 shows the detailed categories of four types of experience goods identified, as well as the 
search goods, following the classification schema of Nelson (1974) and Liebermann and Flint-
Goor (1996).    
--------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
--------------------------- 
 
Non-durable Experience Goods involve frequent purchases (such as food and health and 
beauty products) that the consumer experiences over multiple uses. Markets for both non-durable 
experience goods and search goods typically exhibit weak brand loyalty and a high degree of 
market competition. In other words, the opportunity for inexpensive repeat buying to judge 
product value renders non-durable experience goods similar to search goods. 
Durable Experience Goods, such as automobiles, permit less learning from repeat buying   11 
and also require longer for a product’s attributes to be fully known, e.g., reliability. 
Experience Services and Credence Services both involve a high degree of information 
asymmetry between sellers and buyers. The products tend to be diversified, so information about 
one brand or type is not very useful in evaluating competing services, and even with the passage 
of time the consumer may find it difficult to judge its value. Examples of experience services are 
air travel and nursing homes. Mutual funds, health care and auto repairs are examples of 
Credence Services. 
Consumers are not totally reliant on firms for product information. Government agencies 
such as the Consumer Products Safety Commission and the Food and Drug Administration are 
important sources of information.  In the private sector, Better Business Bureaus and 
organizations such as Consumer Reports magazine exist to provide information to consumers. 
Nevertheless, a firm’s reputation is probably one of its most valuable assets, and investing in 
CSR is a way of enhancing that value.               
In our sample of 696 firms, the distribution by class of goods is as follows: search goods 
(21%), non-durable experience goods (11%), durable experience goods (25%), experience 
services (37%), and credence services (6%).  
 
IV. Empirical Results 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics and a correlation matrix for the variables used in 
the regression equations.    Unfortunately, we have only a single cross section, with each variable 
measured in 2001 and lagged profit computed in 2000.  The representative firm in our sample 
generated approximately $6.9 billion in sales, earned a 14.3% return on equity, and allocated 
3.5% of sales to R&D.  Not surprisingly, the two measures of CSR are strongly positively   12 
correlated.  Most importantly, a firm’s propensity to sell experience or credence goods appears 
to be positively correlated with the probability that it is considered to be socially responsible.   
 
--------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
--------------------------- 
 
Recall that our key hypothesis is that firms producing an experience good or service are 
more likely to engage in CSR.  To test this conjecture, we estimated probit regressions of the 
determinants of a firm’s probability that it is considered to be socially responsible.  Table 3 
reports the coefficients and standard errors, which are corrected for possible heteroskedasticity.
1   
 
--------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
--------------------------- 
   
Recall also that we have two dependent variables: CSR1, a dummy variable denoting whether 
the firm is in the KLD Large Cap Social Index and CSR2, a dummy variable denoting whether 
the firm has more CSR “strengths” than “weaknesses,” according to KLD.  The independent 
variables are dummy variables for search, experience, and credence goods, as well as firm size, 
lagged profit, and R&D intensity.  In columns (1) and (4) of Table 3, we include a single dummy 
for search goods, while in the remaining columns we include separate dummy variables for non-
durable experience goods, durable experience goods, experience services, and credence services. 
 R&D intensity is also included as a regressor in columns (3) and (6).   
  Several potentially interesting stylized facts emerge from the econometric results.  
                                                 
1 We also estimated logit regressions, which yielded similar results.      13 
Contrary to expectations, we find no evidence that large firms are more likely to be socially 
responsible.  However, for both measures of CSR, the results strongly suggest that firms 
producing search goods are less likely to engage in CSR.  Columns (2), (3), (5), and (6) reveal 
that companies selling durable experience goods and especially, credence services have the 
highest probability of investing in CSR.  This pattern is consistent with theories of strategic CSR, 
which predict that the level of asymmetric information and the importance of firm reputation are 
highest for credence goods or services.   
Although the regression estimates are important, it also useful to compute to increase or 
decrease in probability of CSR associated with a variable whose coefficient is statistically 
significant.  In this regard, we computed slope parameters, or the marginal effects evaluated at 
the means of the other explanatory variables.  For the dummy variables that measure search, 
experience, or goods, the marginal effect is ΔProbC = Prob[C*=1| z =1] - Prob[C*=1| z = 0], 
where z is the dummy variable of interest.   These findings indicate that selling a search good 
reduces the probability that a firm is considered to be socially responsible by about 18% 
(averaged across all the models we estimate), at the margin.  Firms whose products are durable 
experience goods or credence services are significantly more likely to engage in CSR, with an 
increased probability of about 15% and 23% (averaged across all the models we estimate), 
respectively.    
Various measures of goodness of fit for limited dependent variable models have been 
proposed in the literature. The average (across all models) pseudo R-squared value proposed for 
the probit by Zavoina and McKelvey (1975) is .41.  Another frequently reported statistic in 
models of binary choice is the proportion of outcomes correctly predicted by the fitted equation. 
However, this is sensitive to the chosen probability level, i.e., what P value equates to C* = 1,   14 
with .50 as the typical default.  That is not satisfactory in the present case because the sample 
is unbalanced, with .71 of the observations being C* =1 (for CSR1).  For example, if a threshold 
probability of .68 is chosen, then 85% of actual 1s are correctly predicted, and 67% of 0s and 1s 
correctly predicted.
2  Hosmer and Lemeshow (1989) proposed a diagnostic statistic to assess the 
match between actual and predicted values (see Limdep 8, p. E15-28 for details). The test 
statistic follows a chi-squared distribution, and values less than the critical value is evidence in 
favor of the model. For the probit model of Table 3, the Hosmer-Lemeshow test statistic for 
variant is always lower than the 95% critical value of 15.51 (prob = .08). Thus, the probit model 
specification cannot be rejected for each variant of the model.   
 
V. Conclusions and Caveats 
In a recent insightful survey of CSR, The Economist (2005, 8) identified four varieties of 
CSR, based on whether this activity raised or lowered profits and raised or lowered social 
welfare.  This paper constitutes the first empirical test of recent theories of strategic CSR.  
Specifically, we focus on the importance of the type of product or service sold by a firm as a 
determinant of management’s decision to invest in CSR.  This decision could represent a 
signaling device regarding the quality of the firm’s output.  
                                                 
2 The table of actual and predicted 0s and 1s is shown below.  
 
           Predicted 
 ------  ----------  +  ----- 
 Actual      0    1  |  Total              
 ------  ----------  +  ----- 
   0        47  154  |    201 
   1        72  423  |    495 
 ------  ----------  +  ----- 
 Total     119  577  |    696 
   15 
Consistent with these theories of strategic CSR, we find that firms selling durable 
experience goods or credence services are much more likely than comparable firms to be socially 
responsible.  At the margin, our results imply that a firm selling financial services (a credence 
service) is about 23% more likely to opt for CSR.  Similarly, a firm producing durable 
experience goods, such as automobiles or software, is about 15% more likely to be socially 
responsible.  Firms selling experience services or non-durable experience goods are no more 
likely to adopt CSR than a firm whose product is a search good.   
While additional research is needed to pin down the diverse reasons why firms adopt a 
CSR stance, the evidence presented here supports a view that it is consistent with theories of 
strategic CSR and rational, profit-seeking management decision-making. Others may view the 
same evidence as proof that CSR is a ‘fraud’ or ‘smokescreen’ to disguise the same behavior, 
which they abhor.    
Several caveats should be mentioned.  The first is that our empirical analysis is based on 
a single cross section of data.  It would be useful to test theories of strategic CSR using panel 
data, which would enable us to better control for unobserved firm heterogeneity and changes in 
CSR behavior and its determinants over time.  A second concern is the possibility that our 
econometric analysis is subject to omitted variables bias.  In contrast to ordinary least squares 
estimation, the estimated coefficients in a probit model are inconsistent, even if the omitted 
variables are uncorrelated with the included regressors (see Greene (2000) (p. 828).  It is 
impossible to assess the importance of this effect on our estimates of the impact of good type on 
the propensity of firms to engage in CSR.    
   16 
Table 1 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations (N=696 firms) 
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   +p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01 
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Table 3 
             Probit Estimates of the Determinants of the Propensity of Firms to Engage in CSR 
 
          
Independent                                                        Dependent Variable:  
Variables                        CSR1           CSR1          CSR1           CSR2           CSR2          CSR2 
Constant     .576*** 
   (.063) 
     .457*** 
     (.075) 
     .387*** 
     (.091) 
  .360*** 
   (.112) 
     .381** 
     (.123) 
     .299** 
     (.145) 
Search   -405** 
   (.199) 
    -.366** 
   (.181) 
   
Non-Durable 
Experience Good 










     .232** 
    (.112) 
   .254** 
    (.125) 
     .232** 
    (.112) 
   .244** 
    (.121) 










      .387*** 
(.143) 
     .412*** 
(.156) 
      .452*** 
(.164) 





  (.019) 
    -.050*** 
    (.018) 
 -.041* 
    (.026) 
    .012 
   (.016) 
.131 
    (.132) 
 .115 







    .005** 
(.002) 
    .004* 
   (.002) 
.002 
(.002) 
    .004** 
(.002) 
R&D Intensity       .082 
(.060) 
    .073 
(.051) 
Log Likelihood  - 411.66  - 394.18  - 392.82  - 397.29  -381.25  -380.89 
 
N = 696 firms, Standard Errors in parentheses. Significance: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
CSR1 is a dummy variable, with a value of 1 if a firm is included in the 2002 KLD Large Cap     
           Social Index (LCSI); 0 otherwise. 
CSR2 is a dummy variable, with a value of 1 if a firm has more CSR strengths than weaknesses; 
           0 otherwise.   19 
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